《山东文献集成·第一辑》（50册），韩寓群主编，2006年12月，定价：25000元
地方文献丛书的编刊，在我国是有传统的，形成了古籍丛书的一大门类，如《岭南遗书》、《畿辅丛书》、《山右丛书初编》、《辽海丛书》、《关陇丛书》、《安徽丛书》、《湖北先正遗书》、《湖南丛书》等等，都称得上一省文化之标志。可是，山东作为一个文化大省从没有像其他几个省份那样，编印出足以标志山东文化的“山东丛书”，这一个遗憾，在《山东文献集成》问世后，得到了很好的弥补。

山东历史上产生的著述在一万种以上，数量庞大，具备选编地方文献丛书的优越条件。2005年山东大学文史哲研究院王学典院长、杜泽逊教授提出编纂《山东文献集成》的计划，山东省人民政府特批立项，成为山东省政府重大文化工程。《山东文献集成》由韩寓群任主编，朱正昌、展涛等任副主编，王学典、杜泽逊任编纂处主任、副主任。全书计划搜集山东先贤著述1000种，主要收入流传未广而又价值较高的稿本、钞本、刻本等，影印出版。非山东人士所撰关于山东的重要书籍，亦酌予收入。共分四辑，精装十六开本200册。

　　2006年12月由山东大学出版社出版的第一辑50册，收书179种，以名家未刊稿本、钞本为主。其中经学著作有清卢见曾《读易便解》（清钞本）、清牟庭《周易注》（钞本）、清张尔岐《书经直解》（清钞本）、清牛运震《尚书评注》（清钞本）、清宋书升《尚书考》（稿本）、清王守训《诗毛传补证》（稿本）、《春秋地理补考》（稿本）。语言文字学著作有清王维言《方言释义》（稿本）、清时庸劢《单县时氏音学遗著》三十八种六十二卷（稿本）。金石学著作有清刘喜海《古泉苑》一百卷（清稿本）、清翁树培撰、刘喜海补注《古泉汇考》（稿本）、清许瀚《许印林先生吉金考释》（钞本）、《攀古小庐古器物铭》（钞本）、《攀古小庐砖瓦文字》（王献唐钞本）、《攀古小庐古器物铭释文初草》（稿本）、《捃古录金文考释》（王献唐钞本）等。史部著作有清李文藻《恩平程记》（稿本）、《长途备忘录》（稿本）、清杨以增撰、杨绍和辑《杨端勤公奏疏》（清稿本）等。集部有清高凤翰《南阜山人诗集类稿》、《斅文存稿》（清刘喜海藏精钞本）、清孔广栻辑《海岱人文》三十三种（稿本）、清蒲松龄《聊斋文集》（清抄本十一册、稿本一册）等。琳琅满目，美不胜收。这些珍贵的稿本、钞本，大都未曾刊印过，学术界难得一见。

　　济阳张尔岐是清初著名经学家。顾炎武曾说：“独精三礼，卓然经师，吾不如张稷若。”对张尔岐评价很高。但张氏教授乡里，生前著述多未刊行，今影印其《书经直解》清钞本，对《书经》之诠释，深入浅出，细致入微，显示出张氏深厚的经学功力。诸城刘喜海为金石学大家，久负盛名，其《古泉苑》一百卷，系清稿本。又大兴翁树培《古泉汇考》，从未刊行，刘喜海在书眉作了详细批注考释，是计划刊印而未成的原稿本，书中还保存了著名金石学家利津李佐贤、福山王懿荣的手批，更加珍贵。王献唐先生曾说：“大兴翁氏《古泉汇考》与刘氏《古泉苑》、李氏《古泉汇》并为泉学巨制，李书已刻行，此与《泉苑》迄未付梓，学者以不见为憾。”刘氏《古泉苑》保存在山东省博物馆，翁著刘批的《古泉汇考》原件保存于山东省图书馆，今将二书一并影印，可谓中国古钱币学史上的一件大事。音韵学大家时庸劢，曾是著名金石学家吴式芬的门人，对清代音韵学家顾炎武、江永、戴震、段玉裁、王念孙、孔广森等人的成就进行了系统总结，并提出独到的古音体系。王献唐先生认为：“他的功力和新颖见解，在清代二百六十年内，具有山东全省的代表性，同时也有全国的代表性。”但时氏音学遗著沉埋一百多年，几乎不为人知，此次全部影印问世，将为研究中国音韵学提供一大批崭新的文献资料，也为我们全面认识有清一代的音韵学成就提供更为广泛的可靠依据。日照许瀚为清中叶著名金石学家、文字学家和校勘学家，龚自珍《己亥杂诗》称赞他“北方学者君第一”。但一生潦倒，著述多未刊行。王献唐先生作为日照后学，曾努力搜访借钞，在1931年前后集为《许印林遗书》，计21种，一大函。在七十余年后影印问世，实现了老一代文献学家的宿愿。

　　对山东文献的系统搜集整理工作，前人早已开始。以诗歌而论，乾隆间卢见曾辑刻《国朝山左诗钞》六十卷，收入清初山东诗人620余家的诗作，同时宋弼辑《山左明诗钞》三十五卷，乾隆三十六年李文藻刻印，收明代山东诗人431家，张鹏展辑刻《国朝山左诗续钞》三十二卷《补钞》四卷，上继卢氏，收山东诗人747家的诗作。道光间余正酉又辑刻《国朝山左诗汇钞后集》三十九卷，收入山东诗人389家的诗作。合计以上四种，共得近五百年间山东诗人2187家，每人都系有小传。其中绝大部分人物没有别集传世，其姓名亦不见经传，因此这四种前后蝉连的地方诗歌总集，是极为珍贵的文献资料，对研究山东古代文学史、古代历史，乃至整个中国古代文学史、古代历史，都堪称资料渊薮。此次将四种总集配齐影印，有着不同寻常的学术意义。

　　有些具有重要文献价值的著述，尽管曾经印行，但流传仍十分稀少。例如莱阳姜埰、姜垓兄弟，在明末清初都有重要影响。姜埰《敬亭集》有光绪十五年山东官书局刻本，尚不难得。其弟姜垓在崇祯间曾建言除掉题名碑上奸臣阮大铖的名字，南明弘光间阮大铖得势，欲杀姜垓，垓乃变易姓名，逃到宁波，明亡后隐居苏州。姜垓的集子《流览堂残稿》六卷，经其后人四处搜集，于宣统二年由莱阳通兴石印馆石印。这个普普通通的石印本，十分罕见。值得指出的是，该书有王懿荣在光绪二十六年四月作的序言，三个月后八国联军进北京，王氏就以身殉国了。这篇序言《王懿荣集》没有收录，其子王崇焕作的《王文敏公年谱》也只字未提。该序对研究王懿荣显然有不可忽视的价值。

《山东文献集成》有三个特点，一是规模大，收书1000种；二是选择未刊稿本、抄本多，而且质量高，其学术价值因而也较高；三是影印出版，能在一定程度上展示古书原貌，对读者十分重要。由《山东文献集成》的影印出版，笔者联想到近二三十年间地方文献整理工作的状况。笔者发现，许多地方文献整理出版工作缺乏总体规划，规模很小，零打碎搞，质量更是参差不齐。笔者认为，《山东文献集成》的这些做法对新时期地方文献整理工作具有示范意义。 （程远芬 中华读书报　2007年7月25日）

Dominique Mo?si
Summary:  The world today faces not only a clash of civilizations but a clash of emotions as well. The West displays -- and is divided by -- a culture of fear, while the Arab and Muslim worlds are trapped in a culture of humiliation and much of Asia displays a culture of hope.
Dominique Mo飐i is a Senior Adviser at the Institut Fran鏰is des Relations Internationales (IFRI) in Paris. 
Fear, Humiliation, Hope, and the New World Order
Thirteen years ago, Samuel Huntington argued that a "clash of civilizations" was about to dominate world politics, with culture, along with national interests and political ideology, becoming a geopolitical fault line ("The Clash of Civilizations?" Summer 1993). Events since then have proved Huntington's vision more right than wrong. Yet what has not been recognized sufficiently is that today the world faces what might be called a "clash of emotions" as well. The Western world displays a culture of fear, the Arab and Muslim worlds are trapped in a culture of humiliation, and much of Asia displays a culture of hope.
Instead of being united by their fears, the twin pillars of the West, the United States and Europe, are more often divided by them -- or rather, divided by how best to confront or transcend them. The culture of humiliation, in contrast, helps unite the Muslim world around its most radical forces and has led to a culture of hatred. The chief beneficiaries of the deadly encounter between the forces of fear and the forces of humiliation are the bystanders in the culture of hope, who have been able to concentrate on creating a better future for themselves.
These moods, of course, are not universal within each region, and there are some areas, such as Russia and parts of Latin America, that seem to display all of them simultaneously. But their dynamics and interactions will help shape the world for years to come.
THE CULTURE OF FEAR
The United States and Europe are divided by a common culture of fear. On both sides, one encounters, in varying degrees, a fear of the other, a fear of the future, and a fundamental anxiety about the loss of identity in an increasingly complex world.
In the case of Europe, there are layers of fear. There is the fear of being invaded by the poor, primarily from the South -- a fear driven by demography and geography. Images of Africans being killed recently as they tried to scale barbed wire to enter a Spanish enclave in Morocco evoked images of another time not so long ago, when East Germans were shot at as they tried to reach freedom in the West. Back then, Germans were killed because they wanted to escape oppression. Today, Africans are being killed because they want to escape absolute poverty.
Europeans also fear being blown up by radical Islamists or being demographically conquered by them as their continent becomes a "Eurabia." After the bombings in Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005 and the scares this past summer, Europeans have started to face the hard reality that their homelands are not only targets for terrorists but also bases for them.
Then there is the fear of being left behind economically. For many Europeans, globalization has come to be equated with destabilization and job cuts. They are haunted by the fear that Europe will become a museum -- a larger and more modern version of Venice, a place for tourists ... （From Foreign Affairs, January/February 2007  Article preview: first 500 of 2,098 words total.）

世界感情冲突　　多米尼克·莫伊西  （吴万伟 译）

13年前，萨缪尔·亨廷顿（Samuel Huntington）说“文明冲突”将主宰世界政治。从那以后的事件已经证明亨廷顿的观点正确比错误多。不过，更准确的说法应该是“感情的冲突。”西方世界表现出了恐怖文化，阿拉伯和穆斯林世界则陷入羞耻文化，而亚洲许多地方则表现了希望文化。
　　美国和欧洲被同一个恐怖文化所分开。在大西洋两岸，人们看到不同程度上的恐惧别人，恐惧未来，和对在日益复杂的世界上失去身份认同和把握自己命运的根本性焦虑。
　　说到欧洲，那里有一种主要来自南边的穷人入侵的恐惧。欧洲人还担心被极端伊斯兰分子毁灭，或者被他们在人口数量上征服，因为欧洲变得越来越成欧罗比亚（Eurabia）。接着就是担心被在经济上抛在后面。最后，他们还担心被外来强权，即使是友好的盟友（比如美国）或者被没有面孔的力量（如欧盟委员会（European Commission）的控制。
　　失去控制的某些感觉在美国同样存在。人口数量上的恐惧虽然有点缓和，仍然很明显存在。美国人不像欧洲人那样担心经济上的衰落，（虽然他们担心外购）但是他们想到身体上的衰落，比如肥胖的困扰，预算，庞大的财政赤字，精神上的衰落，失去海外冒险的热情，越来越怀疑国家的目的。当然9-11袭击后，美国人对安全开始过分关注。
　　欧洲人试图通过逃避和妥协的结合保护自己免受世界的威胁，美国人则试图通过在海外根源处解决这个问题。但是在布什政府高调和乐观的言辞背后隐藏着的是美国对9-11袭击的反应让美国比从前更加让人讨厌的清醒的现实。比如，美国在伊拉克的干预行动造成的问题比解决的问题还多。
　　与此同时，穆斯林世界陷入衰落已经几个世纪了。当欧洲在中世纪的时候，伊斯兰处在顶峰。但是当西方文艺复兴开始后，伊斯兰就开始不可阻挡的衰落了。
　　穆斯林认为在阿拉伯的心脏地带成立以色列国家是他们衰落的最终标志。对于犹太人来说，以色列的合法性是多方面的。它结合了宗教诺言的实现，国家身份认同的实现，和国际社会对犹太人承受大屠杀灾难的补偿。但是对于阿拉伯人来说，这是在反殖民主义风起云涌时刻，西方殖民主义强加于人的时代错误的逻辑。
　　以色列与阿拉伯邻居难解难分的冲突帮助感到羞耻的文化变成感到仇恨的文化。随着时间的推移，冲突的国家性质开始转移到最初的宗教基础，也就是穆斯林和犹太人的冲突，甚至是伊斯兰也整个西方的冲突。
　　伊拉克日益严重的内战和黎巴嫩真主党和以色列的斗争结合起来进一步强化了许多穆斯林的仇恨意识，这个意识被伊朗和它的盟友充分利用和煽动起来。经济上赢家和输家在全球化背景下差距的扩大进一步让这个问题雪上加霜。
　　羞辱文化同时也延伸到了生活在西方的穆斯林移民。2005年秋天法国发生的暴乱就有基本上社会经济根源，同时也是沮丧的人对口口声声在理论上人人平等在实际上却做不到的社会不满情绪的大爆发。
　　在西方和中东争吵不休的时候，发展的信心转移到了东方。经过了两个世纪的相对衰落，中国正在恢复理应得到的国际大国地位。中国集中经济发展同时避免冲突的政策为北京赢得了物质利益和国家尊重。至于印度，在现代史上第一次作为独立和重要的大国登上国际舞台。虽然两者都面临很多问题，但是当今的乐观主义是真实的，只要发展继续下去，乐观主义也能一直保持。
　　考虑到全球感情冲突，西方的首要任务必须是认识到穆斯林世界的羞辱文化对欧洲和美国威胁的本质。不管是妥协还是武力本身都不能解决问题。现在展开的战争羞辱文化无法胜利，但是西方可能输掉的战争，如果继续分裂，背叛自由的价值，缺乏对法律和个人的尊重。西方的挑战不是寻找如何让温和的伊斯兰对抗极端主义力量，而是要找到如何鼓励在穆斯林社会充分认识到希望和进步，以避免绝望和愤怒把民众送到极端分子的怀抱。
　　在这方面，巴以冲突好像就是世界未来的一个缩影。以色列是西方，周围是梦想从危险地区逃离和重新进入希望文化的羞辱文化。但是首先必须找到解决巴勒斯坦人问题的方法，不然逃离就是不可能的。同样的，欧洲和美国要寻求永远消除恐惧，就只有在找到方法帮助穆斯林世界解决自身问题的情况下才有可能。（译自：“The global clash of emotions ”Dominique Moïsi http://www.iht.com/bin/print.php?id=3898842）
The global clash of emotions Dominique Mo?si
Thursday, December 14, 2006
PARIS: Thirteen years ago, Samuel Huntington argued that a "clash of civilizations" was about to dominate world politics. Events since then have proved Huntington's vision more right than wrong. It would be more correct, however, to speak of a "clash of emotions." The Western world displays a culture of fear, the Arab and Muslim worlds are trapped in a culture of humiliation, and much of Asia displays a culture of hope.
The United States and Europe are divided by a common culture of fear. On both sides, one encounters, in varying degrees, a fear of the other, a fear of the future and a fundamental anxiety about the loss of identity and control over one's destiny in an increasingly complex world.
In the case of Europe, there is the fear of being invaded by the poor, primarily from the south. Europeans also fear being blown up by radical Islamists or being demographically conquered by them as their continent becomes a "Eurabia." Then there is the fear of being left behind economically. Finally, there is the fear of being ruled by an outside power, even a friendly one (such as the United States) or a faceless one (such as the European Commission).
Some of the same sense of loss of control is present in the United States. Demographic fears are mitigated, but they are clearly present. Americans do not fear economic decay the way Europeans do (although they worry about outsourcing). Yet they, too, are thinking of decline — in their bodies, with the plague of obesity; in their budgets, with the huge deficits; and in their spirit, with the loss of appetite for foreign adventures and a growing questioning of national purpose. And of course after 9/11, Americans are obsessed with security.
Whereas Europeans try to protect themselves from the world through a combination of escapism and appeasement, Americans try to do so by dealing with the problem at its source abroad. But behind the Bush administration's forceful and optimistic rhetoric lies the somber reality that the U.S. response to 9/11 has made the United States more unpopular than ever. The U.S. intervention in Iraq, for example, has generated more problems than it has solved.
The Muslim world, meanwhile, has been obsessed with decay for centuries. When Europe was in its Middle Ages, Islam was at its apogee, but when the Western Renaissance started, Islam began its inexorable fall.
Muslims saw the creation of the state of Israel in the midst of Arab land as the ultimate proof of their decline. For Jews, the legitimacy of Israel was manifold; it combined the accomplishment of a religious promise, the realization of a national destiny, and compensation by the international community for a unique crime, the Holocaust. For Arabs, by contrast, it was the anachronistic imposition of a Western colonial logic at the very moment decolonization was getting under way.
The unresolved conflict between Israel and its neighbors has helped turn the culture of humiliation into a culture of hatred. Over time, the conflict's national character has shifted to its original religious basis — a conflict between Muslims and Jews, if not a clash between Islam and the West at large.
The combination of the deepening civil war in Iraq and the fighting in Lebanon between Hezbollah and Israel has reinforced a sense of outrage in many Muslims that has been fully exploited by Iran and its allies. And globalization, with its expansion of the gap between economic winners and losers, has contributed to the problem.
The culture of humiliation extends to the Muslim diaspora in the West as well. The riots in France during the autumn of 2005, for example, had an essentially socioeconomic origin, but they were also a lashing out by the disaffected against a society that claims to give them equal rights in principle but fails to do so in practice.
As the West and the Middle East lock horns, confidence in progress has been moving eastward. After two centuries of relative decline, China is recovering its legitimate international status. Its policy of concentrating on economic development while avoiding conflict seems to be earning Beijing both material benefits and international respect. As for India, for the first time in its modern history it has stepped onto the world stage as both an independent and an important power. Difficulties abound for both, but the optimism today is real and seems likely to last as long as growth continues.
Given the global clash of emotions, the first priority for the West must be to recognize the nature of the threat that the Muslim world's culture of humiliation poses to Europe and the United States. Neither appeasement nor force alone will suffice. The war that is unfolding is one that the culture of humiliation cannot win, but it is a war nonetheless and one that the West can lose by continuing to be divided or by betraying its liberal values and its respect for law and the individual. The challenge is not figuring out how to play moderate Islam against the forces of radicalism. It is figuring out how to encourage a sufficient sense of hope and progress in Muslim societies so that despair and anger do not send the masses into the radicals' arms.
In that regard, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict appears more than ever as a microcosm of what the world is becoming. Israel is the West, surrounded by the culture of humiliation and dreaming of escape from a dangerous region and of re-entry into a culture of hope. But it must find a solution to the Palestinian problem first, or else the escape will not be possible. So, too, Europe and America seek to permanently banish their fears but will be able to do so only by finding a way to help the Muslim world solve its problems.