Dominique Mo?si
Summary:  The world today faces not only a clash of civilizations but a clash of emotions as well. The West displays -- and is divided by -- a culture of fear, while the Arab and Muslim worlds are trapped in a culture of humiliation and much of Asia displays a culture of hope.
Dominique Mo飐i is a Senior Adviser at the Institut Fran鏰is des Relations Internationales (IFRI) in Paris. 
Fear, Humiliation, Hope, and the New World Order
Thirteen years ago, Samuel Huntington argued that a "clash of civilizations" was about to dominate world politics, with culture, along with national interests and political ideology, becoming a geopolitical fault line ("The Clash of Civilizations?" Summer 1993). Events since then have proved Huntington's vision more right than wrong. Yet what has not been recognized sufficiently is that today the world faces what might be called a "clash of emotions" as well. The Western world displays a culture of fear, the Arab and Muslim worlds are trapped in a culture of humiliation, and much of Asia displays a culture of hope.
Instead of being united by their fears, the twin pillars of the West, the United States and Europe, are more often divided by them -- or rather, divided by how best to confront or transcend them. The culture of humiliation, in contrast, helps unite the Muslim world around its most radical forces and has led to a culture of hatred. The chief beneficiaries of the deadly encounter between the forces of fear and the forces of humiliation are the bystanders in the culture of hope, who have been able to concentrate on creating a better future for themselves.
These moods, of course, are not universal within each region, and there are some areas, such as Russia and parts of Latin America, that seem to display all of them simultaneously. But their dynamics and interactions will help shape the world for years to come.
THE CULTURE OF FEAR
The United States and Europe are divided by a common culture of fear. On both sides, one encounters, in varying degrees, a fear of the other, a fear of the future, and a fundamental anxiety about the loss of identity in an increasingly complex world.
In the case of Europe, there are layers of fear. There is the fear of being invaded by the poor, primarily from the South -- a fear driven by demography and geography. Images of Africans being killed recently as they tried to scale barbed wire to enter a Spanish enclave in Morocco evoked images of another time not so long ago, when East Germans were shot at as they tried to reach freedom in the West. Back then, Germans were killed because they wanted to escape oppression. Today, Africans are being killed because they want to escape absolute poverty.
Europeans also fear being blown up by radical Islamists or being demographically conquered by them as their continent becomes a "Eurabia." After the bombings in Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005 and the scares this past summer, Europeans have started to face the hard reality that their homelands are not only targets for terrorists but also bases for them.
Then there is the fear of being left behind economically. For many Europeans, globalization has come to be equated with destabilization and job cuts. They are haunted by the fear that Europe will become a museum -- a larger and more modern version of Venice, a place for tourists ... （From Foreign Affairs, January/February 2007  Article preview: first 500 of 2,098 words total.）

世界感情冲突　　多米尼克·莫伊西  （吴万伟 译）

13年前，萨缪尔·亨廷顿（Samuel Huntington）说“文明冲突”将主宰世界政治。从那以后的事件已经证明亨廷顿的观点正确比错误多。不过，更准确的说法应该是“感情的冲突。”西方世界表现出了恐怖文化，阿拉伯和穆斯林世界则陷入羞耻文化，而亚洲许多地方则表现了希望文化。
　　美国和欧洲被同一个恐怖文化所分开。在大西洋两岸，人们看到不同程度上的恐惧别人，恐惧未来，和对在日益复杂的世界上失去身份认同和把握自己命运的根本性焦虑。
　　说到欧洲，那里有一种主要来自南边的穷人入侵的恐惧。欧洲人还担心被极端伊斯兰分子毁灭，或者被他们在人口数量上征服，因为欧洲变得越来越成欧罗比亚（Eurabia）。接着就是担心被在经济上抛在后面。最后，他们还担心被外来强权，即使是友好的盟友（比如美国）或者被没有面孔的力量（如欧盟委员会（European Commission）的控制。
　　失去控制的某些感觉在美国同样存在。人口数量上的恐惧虽然有点缓和，仍然很明显存在。美国人不像欧洲人那样担心经济上的衰落，（虽然他们担心外购）但是他们想到身体上的衰落，比如肥胖的困扰，预算，庞大的财政赤字，精神上的衰落，失去海外冒险的热情，越来越怀疑国家的目的。当然9-11袭击后，美国人对安全开始过分关注。
　　欧洲人试图通过逃避和妥协的结合保护自己免受世界的威胁，美国人则试图通过在海外根源处解决这个问题。但是在布什政府高调和乐观的言辞背后隐藏着的是美国对9-11袭击的反应让美国比从前更加让人讨厌的清醒的现实。比如，美国在伊拉克的干预行动造成的问题比解决的问题还多。
　　与此同时，穆斯林世界陷入衰落已经几个世纪了。当欧洲在中世纪的时候，伊斯兰处在顶峰。但是当西方文艺复兴开始后，伊斯兰就开始不可阻挡的衰落了。
　　穆斯林认为在阿拉伯的心脏地带成立以色列国家是他们衰落的最终标志。对于犹太人来说，以色列的合法性是多方面的。它结合了宗教诺言的实现，国家身份认同的实现，和国际社会对犹太人承受大屠杀灾难的补偿。但是对于阿拉伯人来说，这是在反殖民主义风起云涌时刻，西方殖民主义强加于人的时代错误的逻辑。
　　以色列与阿拉伯邻居难解难分的冲突帮助感到羞耻的文化变成感到仇恨的文化。随着时间的推移，冲突的国家性质开始转移到最初的宗教基础，也就是穆斯林和犹太人的冲突，甚至是伊斯兰也整个西方的冲突。
　　伊拉克日益严重的内战和黎巴嫩真主党和以色列的斗争结合起来进一步强化了许多穆斯林的仇恨意识，这个意识被伊朗和它的盟友充分利用和煽动起来。经济上赢家和输家在全球化背景下差距的扩大进一步让这个问题雪上加霜。
　　羞辱文化同时也延伸到了生活在西方的穆斯林移民。2005年秋天法国发生的暴乱就有基本上社会经济根源，同时也是沮丧的人对口口声声在理论上人人平等在实际上却做不到的社会不满情绪的大爆发。
　　在西方和中东争吵不休的时候，发展的信心转移到了东方。经过了两个世纪的相对衰落，中国正在恢复理应得到的国际大国地位。中国集中经济发展同时避免冲突的政策为北京赢得了物质利益和国家尊重。至于印度，在现代史上第一次作为独立和重要的大国登上国际舞台。虽然两者都面临很多问题，但是当今的乐观主义是真实的，只要发展继续下去，乐观主义也能一直保持。
　　考虑到全球感情冲突，西方的首要任务必须是认识到穆斯林世界的羞辱文化对欧洲和美国威胁的本质。不管是妥协还是武力本身都不能解决问题。现在展开的战争羞辱文化无法胜利，但是西方可能输掉的战争，如果继续分裂，背叛自由的价值，缺乏对法律和个人的尊重。西方的挑战不是寻找如何让温和的伊斯兰对抗极端主义力量，而是要找到如何鼓励在穆斯林社会充分认识到希望和进步，以避免绝望和愤怒把民众送到极端分子的怀抱。
　　在这方面，巴以冲突好像就是世界未来的一个缩影。以色列是西方，周围是梦想从危险地区逃离和重新进入希望文化的羞辱文化。但是首先必须找到解决巴勒斯坦人问题的方法，不然逃离就是不可能的。同样的，欧洲和美国要寻求永远消除恐惧，就只有在找到方法帮助穆斯林世界解决自身问题的情况下才有可能。（译自：“The global clash of emotions ”Dominique Moïsi http://www.iht.com/bin/print.php?id=3898842）
The global clash of emotions Dominique Mo?si
Thursday, December 14, 2006
PARIS: Thirteen years ago, Samuel Huntington argued that a "clash of civilizations" was about to dominate world politics. Events since then have proved Huntington's vision more right than wrong. It would be more correct, however, to speak of a "clash of emotions." The Western world displays a culture of fear, the Arab and Muslim worlds are trapped in a culture of humiliation, and much of Asia displays a culture of hope.
The United States and Europe are divided by a common culture of fear. On both sides, one encounters, in varying degrees, a fear of the other, a fear of the future and a fundamental anxiety about the loss of identity and control over one's destiny in an increasingly complex world.
In the case of Europe, there is the fear of being invaded by the poor, primarily from the south. Europeans also fear being blown up by radical Islamists or being demographically conquered by them as their continent becomes a "Eurabia." Then there is the fear of being left behind economically. Finally, there is the fear of being ruled by an outside power, even a friendly one (such as the United States) or a faceless one (such as the European Commission).
Some of the same sense of loss of control is present in the United States. Demographic fears are mitigated, but they are clearly present. Americans do not fear economic decay the way Europeans do (although they worry about outsourcing). Yet they, too, are thinking of decline — in their bodies, with the plague of obesity; in their budgets, with the huge deficits; and in their spirit, with the loss of appetite for foreign adventures and a growing questioning of national purpose. And of course after 9/11, Americans are obsessed with security.
Whereas Europeans try to protect themselves from the world through a combination of escapism and appeasement, Americans try to do so by dealing with the problem at its source abroad. But behind the Bush administration's forceful and optimistic rhetoric lies the somber reality that the U.S. response to 9/11 has made the United States more unpopular than ever. The U.S. intervention in Iraq, for example, has generated more problems than it has solved.
The Muslim world, meanwhile, has been obsessed with decay for centuries. When Europe was in its Middle Ages, Islam was at its apogee, but when the Western Renaissance started, Islam began its inexorable fall.
Muslims saw the creation of the state of Israel in the midst of Arab land as the ultimate proof of their decline. For Jews, the legitimacy of Israel was manifold; it combined the accomplishment of a religious promise, the realization of a national destiny, and compensation by the international community for a unique crime, the Holocaust. For Arabs, by contrast, it was the anachronistic imposition of a Western colonial logic at the very moment decolonization was getting under way.
The unresolved conflict between Israel and its neighbors has helped turn the culture of humiliation into a culture of hatred. Over time, the conflict's national character has shifted to its original religious basis — a conflict between Muslims and Jews, if not a clash between Islam and the West at large.
The combination of the deepening civil war in Iraq and the fighting in Lebanon between Hezbollah and Israel has reinforced a sense of outrage in many Muslims that has been fully exploited by Iran and its allies. And globalization, with its expansion of the gap between economic winners and losers, has contributed to the problem.
The culture of humiliation extends to the Muslim diaspora in the West as well. The riots in France during the autumn of 2005, for example, had an essentially socioeconomic origin, but they were also a lashing out by the disaffected against a society that claims to give them equal rights in principle but fails to do so in practice.
As the West and the Middle East lock horns, confidence in progress has been moving eastward. After two centuries of relative decline, China is recovering its legitimate international status. Its policy of concentrating on economic development while avoiding conflict seems to be earning Beijing both material benefits and international respect. As for India, for the first time in its modern history it has stepped onto the world stage as both an independent and an important power. Difficulties abound for both, but the optimism today is real and seems likely to last as long as growth continues.
Given the global clash of emotions, the first priority for the West must be to recognize the nature of the threat that the Muslim world's culture of humiliation poses to Europe and the United States. Neither appeasement nor force alone will suffice. The war that is unfolding is one that the culture of humiliation cannot win, but it is a war nonetheless and one that the West can lose by continuing to be divided or by betraying its liberal values and its respect for law and the individual. The challenge is not figuring out how to play moderate Islam against the forces of radicalism. It is figuring out how to encourage a sufficient sense of hope and progress in Muslim societies so that despair and anger do not send the masses into the radicals' arms.
In that regard, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict appears more than ever as a microcosm of what the world is becoming. Israel is the West, surrounded by the culture of humiliation and dreaming of escape from a dangerous region and of re-entry into a culture of hope. But it must find a solution to the Palestinian problem first, or else the escape will not be possible. So, too, Europe and America seek to permanently banish their fears but will be able to do so only by finding a way to help the Muslim world solve its problems.